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Abstract
As social entities, intelligent agents need to collaborate with others regardless
of whether they are cooperative or self-interested. Compared with coopera-
tive agents, collaborations among self-interested agents are more complex and
dynamic due to the selfish features. Self-interested agents are impelled to co-
operate with others by their individual goals. In an agent team composed of
self-interested agents, “common” goals of agents may change to be conflict as the
environment changes. Especially in open and dynamic environments, if factors
such as agent goals, task requirements and resources have been changed, a selfish
agent may need to modify or even relieved the collaboration relationships with
its “colleagues”. Otherwise the collaboration would be conflict or even harm-
ful to its individual goal. Therefore, it is important to include rational team
forming mechanisms in self-interested multi-agent systems. Without a rational
team-forming mechanism, agent teams in a system may have unreasonable or
outdated compositions which obstruct (agent) team members to purchase profits
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or cause unnecessary resource consumptions. Focusing on general self-interested
multi-agent systems, this paper suggests a flexible team forming mechanism that
can enable agents to select team members with reasonable terms and objects.
The flexibility of the mechanism enables agents to form more rational teams
that can avoid potential benefit conflicts among self-interested team members.
1 Introduction
A multi-agent system (MAS) is a collection of intelligent agents [22]. An intelli-
gent agent is a reactive, proactive, autonomous and social entity, which performs
a given task using information gleaned from its environment [10] [17]. Gener-
ally, agents of a MAS can be characterised by whether they are cooperative or
self-interested [11]. However, due to the distributed nature of the problem to be
solved or the limitations of agent abilities, both cooperative and self-interested
agents will often need to collaborate with other agents to achieve their goals [1]
[4].
For self-interested agents, collaborations between agents are based on com-
mon benefits they can achieve together. This kind collaborative relationship is
not as stable as that of cooperative agents. Today, as MAS applications be-
come more and more complex, many multi-agent systems (MASs) need to work
in open and dynamic domains [2] [7] [23] [25]. Uncertainties of open applica-
tion domains bring difficulties to agent team forming in following three major
aspects:
• Firstly, in open environments, a MAS may receives various tasks that
require agents to possess different resources and skills. Towards changes
of task requirements, agent teams in a MAS need to modify their team
compositions to achieve tasks;
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• Secondly, in an agent team, the criteria for evaluating the importance of
team members is associated closely with their contributions in the com-
pletion of tasks. In open environments, it will be difficult to evaluate
the importance of agents since task requirements and agent abilities are
changeable;
• Finally, in an open environment, goals of team members (agents) are
changeable. As the goals of team members change, keeping collabora-
tions with other members may obstruct an self-interested agent to achieve
its individual goal.
In open environments, “there is no single type of organisation that is suit-
able for all situations [8]”. Therefore, in MAS research, it is an important issue
to develop a rational team forming mechanism for MASs. Generally, a team-
forming mechanism can enable agents to form and reform teams automatically,
and to avoid unreasonable or outdated team compositions in MASs. Towards
challenges brought by open environments, a number of researchers try to find an
optimal mechanism for dynamic team forming and member selection. Abdallah,
Shehory and Tambe proposed mechanisms to form agent teams based on skills
of agents that are required for task completion (see [1], [21] and [24]). This kind
of mechanisms are efficient for cooperative MASs. But in self-interested MASs,
individual agents’ willingness and goals are another important factor to be con-
sidered during team forming. The research on team forming for self-interested
agents generally focuses on the problem of forming one-shot teams, which is also
called short-term teams, for individual tasks. In this kind of mechanisms, agents
come together when they need to handle some tasks, and their relationships will
be terminated after tasks have been accomplished. Obviously, one-shot teaming
will arouse frequent grouping and regrouping among agents, and unfortunately,
each grouping/regrouping will consume some resources, such as communication
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resources, computation resources, etc. resources. To overcome the weakness of
one-shot teaming, Rathod and desJardins proposed several stable-team forming
strategies for self-interested MASs [18]. These strategies cite human organisa-
tion styles (i.e. humans always tend to prefer working with people they know
and trust) into MAS organisation formations, and try to make self-interested
agents form long-term relationships to cut team forming consummations. How-
ever, for many self-interested MASs, agent goals or willingness are changeable
and uncertain. A long-term relationship is very hard to be kept after the goals
of team member agents are changed.
In this research, we develop a mechanism that enables self-interested agents
to flexibly choose team durations and members. Factors, such as agent histori-
cal performances, task requirements and resource constraints, are considered in
the mechanism. For open environments, the flexible team forming and member
selection mechanism will be more suitable for self-interested agents applications.
It enables more dynamic and reasonable collaboration between agents and re-
duces unnecessary consumptions and benefit conflicts brought by team forming.
However, due to the highly uncertainties of most open environments, analysis
and evaluation of dynamic factors is not very easy. It is impossible to find a
fixed standard for factors such as “how good an agent performance is”. Re-
garding this point, in the mechanism introduced in this paper, fuzzy rules are
hired to evaluate factors related with team forming. Through this way, an agent
can dynamically select collaboration durations and objectives according to the
result of fuzzy evaluations, and choose collaboration manners more flexibly.
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows. In the second section, the MAS
structures and some important definitions and assumptions in this research are
introduced. Section 3 presents the advantages, disadvantages and suitable ar-
eas of long-term and one-shot teams. The flexible team forming mechanism is
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introduced in Section 4. In Section 5, experiments that compare the flexible
mechanism with one-shot and long-term team forming is presented. Some re-
lated works of this research are presented and compared in Section 6. Finally,
the conclusions and further directions of this research are presented in Section
7.
2 System Architecture and Problem Definition
Various MAS applications may have different system structures. In this re-
search, the MAS environment is set up to demonstrate and analyse the team
forming and member selection mechanisms. Hence, the system structure is set
up toward assisting agent communication and task allocation. Some simplifying
assumptions and definitions, which can avoid adding the scheduling and task
decomposing problems, are also made, and only elementary agents and task
models are included in the MAS. However, these models are generic enough to
be practical and applicable to a wide range of real applications.
2.1 The System Architecture
The MAS architecture of this research is shown in Figure 1. From this figure, it
can be seen that tasks of a MAS are published on the Task Board of the system,
and will be removed from Task Board after been taken by an agent or agent
team (AT). Published tasks are accessible to all individual agents and agent
teams (ATs) of the system. Agents can enter and leave the system according
to their willingness. However, agents have to publish and remove their regis-
tration information on the Agent Board of the system before they enter and
leave the system. The registration information records the skills and status (see
Subsection 2.2) of an agent.
Agent abilities are limited. To perform tasks beyond its ability, an agent
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Figure 1: The System Architecture
needs to collaborate with other agents through joining or forming a team. Each
AT is composed by one (and only one) Team Leader (TL) and several Team
Members (TMs). After an agent joins an AT, it can get payments from the
AT and at the same time it needs to work for the AT for a certain period.
The payment and serving term are described in the contract (see Definition 3)
between the Team Member (TM) and the TL.
2.2 Definitions and Assumptions
In this paper, all agents are assumed to possess a set of resources, and all tasks
are required to be accomplished by using the resources of agents. Agents in this
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paper are self-interested. Their goals are to achieve as much as possible awards
through accomplishing. However, due to resource limitations, agents have to
collaborate with others to execute tasks together (by forming teams).
In this subsection, some important definitions are given. All of these defini-
tions are under the assumptions which are presented in the previous paragraph.
Definition 1 A task is formally defined as ti = 〈wi, R
′
i〉, where wi is the reward
gained by an agent/agent team if task ti is accomplished by that agent/agent
team; R′i is the set of resources or skills, which are possessed by agents of the
system, required by task ti. A task can only be assigned to one agent or AT.
Definition 2 An agent is formally defined as ai = 〈gi, Ri, si〉, where gi is a set
of individual goals of agent ai; Ri is the skills and resources possessed by agent
ai; si is the status of ai, where si = (va, vp, t). si represents whether agent ai
is performing a task and participating an AT. Meanings of different si values
are listed in Table 1. The names and meanings of va, vp and t are listed as
following:
Availability va : va presents whether an agent is performing a task. va = 0
when the agent has no task (available); va = 1 when the agent is perform-
ing a task (not available);
Position Parameter vp : vp presents whether an agent is an individual agent,
TL or TM. vp = 0 when the agent is individual; vp = 1 when the agent is
a TM of an AT; vp = 2 when the agent is a TL of an AT.
Contract Ending Time t : t is the contract ending time of an agent (also
see Definition 3).
Note: R′i in the definition of task is different from Ri in the definition of agent.
R′i denotes the required resources of a task; Ri denotes the possessed resources
of an agent.
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Table 1: Status of an Agent
si value Status of agent ai
(0, 0, 0) Performing no task; has no AT.
(1, 0, 0) Performing a task; has no AT.
(0, 1, 0) Has a one-shot contract as a TM; performing no task currently.
(1, 1, 0) Has a one-shot contract as a TM; performing a task currently.
(0, 1, t) The TM of an AT for period t; performing no task currently.
(1, 1, t) The TM of an AT for period t, performing a task currently.
(0, 2, 0) The TL of an AT; performing no task currently. (It is assumed
that the TL cannot quit from its AT and let t value of a TL
equal to 0.)
(1, 2, 0) The TL of an AT; performing a task currently.
Definition 3 A Contract cij is an agreement between TL ai and TM aj . It can
be defined as cij = 〈tij , pij , Sij〉, where tij is the contract ending time; pij is the
penalty that the TL or TM has to pay if it breaks the contract and terminates
the cooperation relationship before tij ; Sij is a set of payment that aj can gain
through serving the AT. Sij can be described as tuple 〈scij , sdij〉. scij is the
payment that TM aj can gain for each task completed by the AT, when aj
directly participates in the task. sdij is the dividend that TM aj can share for
each task completed by the AT, when aj does not actually participate in that
task. For contracts between the TL and TM of a one-shot team, tij , pij , and
sdij equal to 0.
Definition 4 An Agent Team is a set of agents. It can be formally defined
as ATi = 〈MSi, TRi〉, where MSi is the set of agents that currently are TMs
of ATi; TRi is the capacity of the whole AT. Here, it is assumed that TRi =
∑
j|aj∈MSi
(Rj + Ri), where Ri and Rj are resources possessed by the team
leader and team members, respectively. In the other word, the capability of an
AT is the sum of its TMs’ capabilities and TL’s capability. It is also defined
that ∀i 6= j : MSi ∩ MSj = ∅, which means an agent can only participate in
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one AT.
Definition 5 A Contributor Set CSij(CSij ⊂ MSi) of Agent Team ATi is the
set of agents that participate in performing task tj , where tj is a task of agent
team ATi. For a one-shot team, the CS equals to MSi of the team (also refer
to Definition 4).
Definition 6 For Agent Team ATi, a Member Contribution mcijk is the con-
tribution of agent ak, where ak ∈ CSij , in performing task tj (ti = 〈w, R
′
i〉).
mcijk equals to w/N , where N is the size of CS and w is the task reward.
3 One-Shot and Long-Term Team Forming
After presenting the system architecture and some important definitions, Intro-
ductions and comparisons of the one-shot and long-term team forming mecha-
nisms are presented in this section.
3.1 One-Shot Teams
One-shot team strategy is widely applied in many MAS applications. In this
strategy, agents of the system do not have a team initially. When a task ti is
published in the Task Board, agents start to bid on the new task. The system
facilitator will choose (or randomly select) a bidder to assign the task. After
the agent bided the task successfully, it becomes a TL and starts to look for
collaborators according to the task requirement R′i. Finally, the AT will disband
after ti is accomplished.
Generally, the one-shot team strategy includes following processes. (Here, it
is assumed that the agents of the MAS cannot achieve the task individually.)
1. The system facilitator of the MAS publishes a new task ti (ti = 〈wi, R
′
i〉)
on the Task Board ;
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2. Agents, whose g < wi and s=(0, 0, 0) bid on ti;
3. The system facilitator awards ti to agent aj(aj =< gj , Rj , sj >). At the
same time, aj becomes the TL of agent team ATj and modifies its sj to
(0, 2, 0). At this movement, TRj = Rj ;
4. aj searches the Agent Board to look for agents with status (0, 0, 0), which
can provide the lacking resources R, where R ⊆ (R′i −R
′
i ∩ TRj);
5. aj finds a required agent ap, where Rp ⊆ (R
′
i −R
′
i ∩ TRj);
6. aj sends a contract cjp to ap, where scjp ≤ (wi−gj)·sizeOf(Rp)/sizeOf(R
′
i−
Ri) ;
7. ap accepts cjp if scjp ≥ gp or rejects cjp if scjp ≤ gp;
8. If cjp is accepted by ap, TRj = TRj ∪ Rp, and ap modifies its status to
(0, 1, 0);
9. Goes to Process (4) until TRj = R
′
i;
10. ATj starts to perform ti; the TL and TMs of ATj modify their statuses
to (1, 1, 0) and (1, 2, 0), respectively;
11. ATj accomplishes ti; agents of ATj modify their statuses to (0, 0, 0) and
are released from the team.
One-shot teams always keep loosely coupled relationships among agents as
default. This feature is very suitable for dynamic MAS application domains.
However, many dynamic applications are not that dynamic. For example, the
new tasks may have some similarity, and their requirements might be similar
(which means that they may just need similar ATs). In this case, frequent
grouping and regrouping are not very necessary, especially each grouping will
consume some system resources.
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3.2 Long-Term Teams
The long-term team forming mechanism is different from the one-shot team
forming mechanism. In the long-term team forming mechanism, the AT will
not be dissolved after perform tasks. In the contrary, the TL of the team pays
TMs some payments to keep the cooperation relationships, even if the TM does
not contribute on a task accomplishment. The major motivation of the TL to
keep long-term TMs in a team is to reduce the communication time that is used
in searching TMs and forming teams, so as to bid on tasks as quick as possible.
The long-term team strategy normally includes following processes.
1. TL ai finds several free agents, whose status values are (0, 0, 0), from the
Agent Board and sends them contracts in order to form a team with them.
Agents modify their statuses to (0, 1, tij) if they accept the contracts. In
this case, agent team ATi is formed successfully;
2. TL ai searches the Task Board for a suitable task and bids on task tk(tk =
〈wk, R
′
k〉), where R
′
k ⊆ TRi and wk ≥
∑
j|aj∈MSi
(Sij + gi) (also refer to
Definition 1-4).
3. If tk is bided successfully, TL ai assigns tk to TM ap, aqan, where Rp ∪
Rq...∪Rn is the minimum set that satisfies R
′
k ⊆ Rp ∪Rq...∪Rn. At the
same time, ap, aqan modify their statuses to (1, 1, tip), (1, 1, tiq), (1, 1, tin).
Also, for this task performance, the Contributor Set CSik (refer to Defin-
ition 5) will be {ap, aq, ..., an};
4. ap, aq, ..., an modify their statuses to (0, 1, tip), (0, 1, tiq), ..., (0, 1, tin) after
tk is accomplished;
5. TL ai awards TM am (am ∈ ATi) with (scim + sdim) if am ∈ CSik, or
sdim if am is not in CSik;
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In addition, if the TL ai or TM ap wants to terminate the contract before
the contract ending time tip, they may process following two steps.
1. ai/ap terminates cip with ap/ai, and pays pip to ap/ai;
2. ap is released from ATi, and its status is modified to (0, 0, 0).
Hiring long-term teams can greatly reduce the system consumption caused
by grouping and regrouping. However, most current long-term team forming
strategies cannot figure out when agents should form long-term teams, which
agents should be included in, and how long the relationships should be kept. For
self-interested MAS applications, keeping unnecessary long-term cooperation
relationships could be very dangerous and harmful for the overall performance
of the system.
4 Flexible Team Forming Mechanism
From the comparison of last subsection, it can be seen that both long-term and
one-shot teams have some advantages and disadvantages. One-shot teams are
suitable for dynamic tasks, i.e. requirements of various new tasks are totally
different. On the other side, long-term teams possess advantages when tasks are
“stable” or similar. For self-interested agents, the durations of teams should not
be fixed on a certain term. Take human society as an example. A company may
sign different contracts (with different durations and conditions) with different
employees. According to the performances of employees and statuses of the
market, the company could also modify employees’ contracts. For MASs, it is
also necessary to have a flexible team forming mechanism, which can enable
team leaders to choose different collaboration durations with agents according
to the changing trend of task-requirements and agent performances. In this
section, a flexible team forming mechanism is introduced. In the mechanism,
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valuableness and availability of agents are evaluated. Then, team leaders will
find out required members and choose proper collaboration durations and cost
according to the evaluation results.
4.1 Team Member Performance Evaluations
In general, agents that are always contribute on performing tasks and can bring
many benefits to the team are the most valuable members of an AT. These
agents should be kept into the team for a long term. In contrary, the AT should
not include agents that seldom contribute for the team. In this mechanism, two
factors, which are Utilization Ratio (ur) and Contribution Ratio (cr), are used
to evaluate the valuableness of a TM.
Definition 7 Utilization Ratio urMk (urMk ∈ [0, 1]) is the frequency that a
TM ak has participated in the most recent M tasks of the agent team ATi. It
can be calculated by Formula 1. The value of parameter M is chosen by TLs
or assigned by users. TLs can also adjust M values according to environment
situations and team performances.
urMk =
M∑
j=1
1
M
(j|ak ∈ CSij) (1)
Definition 8 Contribution Ratio crMk (crMk ∈ [0, 1]) is the ratio that TM ak
has contributed to the agent team ATi in the most recent M tasks, and it can
be found out by using Formula 2 (also refer to Definition 6).
crMk =
∑M
j=1 mcijk ( k|ak ∈ CSij)∑M
j=1 wj
(2)
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The following example shows how to evaluate TMs through ur and cr. Sup-
pose that t1 =< 40, R
′
1 >, t2 =< 50, R
′
2 > and t3 =< 60, R
′
3 > are the most
recent three tasks accomplished by agent team ATi. ap, aq, ar and as are TMs of
ATi. TMs that participate in the three tasks are {ap, aq}, {ap, ar} and {ap, aq},
respectively. According to Equation 1 and 2 , it can be found that the ur and
cr values of ap, aq, ar and as are:
ap: ur3p = 1, cr3p =
(40/2+50/2+60/3)
(40+50+60) = 0.5
aq: ur3q = 0.67, cr3q =
(40/2+60/3)
(40+50+60) = 0.33
ar: ur3r = 0.33, cr3r =
50/2
(40+50+60) = 0.17
as: ur3s = 0, cr3p = 0
Comparing the ur and cr values of the four TMs of ATi, it can be seen that
ap is the most important member of ATi. ap frequently participated in recent
tasks and contributed the most benefit to the team. On the other hand, as did
not participate in recent tasks and do not contribute to ATi.
4.2 System Agent Resource Evaluations
With ur and cr, the TL can evaluate the contribution of a TM. However, to
make reasonable contracts with a TM, the TL also need to evaluate whether it
is easy to find similar agents (possess similar resources and skills) in the MAS.
In this mechanism, Agent Resource Availability (ara) is the parameter defined
to evaluation agent resource availability in the MAS.
Definition 9 Agent Resource Availability arak: arak is the ratio of available
agents (do not have a team/task) that possess same or more resources than TM
ak. It can be calculated as Formula 3. In this formula, Nav is the available
agent number of the MAS.
14
arak =
Rk⊆Ri∑
si=(0,0,0)
1
Nav
(3)
For example, suppose that ak is a TM of ATi. Currently, there are ten out
of twenty available agents in the MAS possess same or more resources than ak.
Hence, the ara value of ak is: arak = 0.5.
4.3 Flexible Member Selection by Using Fuzzy Rules
According to the value of the three evaluation parameters introduced in last sub-
section, in this mechanism, TLs use a fuzzy method to determine collaboration
durations and cost with their TMs.
4.3.1 Input and Output Parameters
In the fuzzy method, ur, cr and ara are input parameters. The output para-
meters are Contract Term ct and Commission Amount ca. They are defined in
Definition 10 and 11, respectively.
Definition 10 Contract Term ctk is the parameter to denote the duration that
the AT should keep agent ak. It is an output parameter that needs to be
identified through the fuzzy method. The working range of Contract Term is
in [0, MAXTERM ]. MAXTERM is a constant defined in the MAS. It denotes
the maximum term that an agent can be kept in an AT.
Definition 11 Commission Amount cak is the parameter to denote the max-
imum commission that the AT should pay to agent ak in order to keep it in
the team. It is an output parameter that needs to be identified through the
fuzzy method. The working range of Commission Amount is in [0,MAXPAY ].
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MAXPAY is a parameter decided by TLs. It denotes the maximum payment
that an AT can afford to keep a single agent as a TM.
4.3.2 Membership Functions for Input Parameters
For ur, four linguistic states are selected and expressed by appropriate fuzzy
sets. They are Never (N ), Seldom (S ), Medium (M ) and Frequent (F ). The
other input parameter cr also has four linguistic states, which are None (N ),
Little (L), Medium (M ) and Huge (H ). The trapezoidal [3] fuzzy membership
function is adopted here to define fuzzy memberships of these five fuzzy sets.
The membership functions are defined from Formulae 4 to 7, respectively. They
are also depicted in Figure 2.
FNever(x)/FNone(x) =


1− 5x x ∈ [0, 0.2]
0 x 6∈ [0, 0.2]
(4)
FSeldom(x)/FLittle(x) =


min(1, 10x− 1, 4− 10x) x ∈ [0.1, 0.4]
0 x 6∈ [0.1, 0.4]
(5)
FMedium(x) =


min(1, 10x− 3, 7− 10x) x ∈ [0.3, 0.7]
0 x 6∈ [0.3, 0.7]
(6)
FFrequent(x)/FHuge(x) =


min(1, 10x− 6) x ∈ [0.6, 1]
0 x 6∈ [0.6, 1]
(7)
For ara, three linguistic states are selected, which are Rare (R), Some (S ),
Many (M ). The membership functions for ara are defined from Formulae 8 to
10 and Figure 3.
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Figure 2: Fuzzy Membership Functions for ur/cr
FRare(x) =


1− 4x x ∈ [0, 0.4]
0 x 6∈ [0, 0.4]
(8)
FSome(x) =


min(5x− 1, 3− 5x) x ∈ [0.2, 0.6]
0 x 6∈ [0.2, 0.6]
(9)
FMany(x) =


min(1, 5x− 2) x ∈ [0.4, 1]
0 x 6∈ [0.4, 1]
(10)
4.3.3 Membership Functions for Output Parameters
There are two output parameters,which are Contract Term (ct) and Commission
Level (cl) in the fuzzy method. For ct, four linguistic states are selected, which
are Long (L), Medium (M ), Short (S ) and No (N ). For cl, High (H ), Medium
(M ), Low (L) and No (N ) are chosen as linguistic states. Fuzzy membership
functions of above fuzzy sets are defined from Formulae 11 to 14 and described
in Figure 4.
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Figure 3: Fuzzy Membership Functions for ara
FNo(x) =


1− 10x x ∈ [0, 0.1]
0 x 6∈ [0, 0.1]
(11)
FShort(x)/FLow(x) =


min(1, 10x, 4− 10x) x ∈ [0, 0.4]
0 x 6∈ [0, 0.4]
(12)
FMedium(x) =


min(1, 10x− 3, 7− 10x) x ∈ [0.3, 0.7]
0 x 6∈ [0.3, 0.7]
(13)
FLong(x)/FHigh(x) =


min(1, 10x− 6) x ∈ [0.6, 1]
0 x 6∈ [0.6, 1]
(14)
4.3.4 Fuzzy Rule Base
A fuzzy rule base is a matrix of combinations of each of the input linguistic
parameters and their corresponding output parameters. The rule base in this
mechanism is as Table 2.
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Figure 4: Fuzzy Membership Functions for ct/cl
Table 2: Fuzzy Rule Base Matrix
ara R S M
ur\cr N L M H N L M H N L M H
N N,N M,L N,N N,N N,N N,N
S M,L L,L L,L L,M N,N S,L M,M S,M N,N N,N S,M N,M
M L,M L,M L,H M,L M,M L,M S,L M,L M,M
F L,M L,H L,H M,M L,M L,H L,L L,L L,M
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4.3.5 Determination of Output Membership Values and Defuzzifi-
cation
Each entry of the rule base is a rule, which is defined by ANDing two linguistic
input parameters to produce an output combination, in the form of: IF(F(ur)=α
AND F(cr)=β AND F(ara)=γ) THEN (F(ct)=δ) AND F (cl) = η), where α ∈
{Never, Seldom,Medium, Frequent}, β ∈ {None, Little, Medium, Large}, γ ∈
{Rare, Some, Many}, δ ∈ {Long, Medium, Short, No}, and η ∈ {High, Medium,
Low, No}. In this mechanism, AND (min) operator [5] is used to combine the
membership values together . Hence, the output membership value µδ/η(v) can
be calculated by Formula 15.
µδ/η(v) = MIN(µα(ur), µβ(cr), µγ(ara)) (15)
With the output membership, the output values can be determined by trac-
ing the membership values for each rule back trough the output membership
functions. Finally, centroid defuzzification method [5] is hired to find out the
output value. In centroid defuzzification, the output value is calculated by For-
mula 16, where µ(vi) is the i
th output value, vi is its corresponding output
value, and k is the number of fuzzy rules which are activated.
DF =
∑k
i=1(vi · µ(vi))∑k
i=1 µ(vi)
(16)
5 Experiments
To analyse the performance of the flexible team forming mechanism, some ex-
periments are executed to compare it with one-shot and long-term team forming.
In this section, experiment results are presented to compare one-shot team form-
ing mechanism, long-term team forming mechanism and flexible team forming
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Table 3: a1 and a2 in the Experiment
ID r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7 r8 r9 r10
a1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
a2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
mechanism.
5.1 Experiment Setup
To simulate the scenario introduced in Section 2, the experiment environment
is described as follows:
5.1.1 Agents:
In the experiments, ten kinds of resources (i.e. r1, r2, ..., r10) are defined to
be possessed by agents. Each agent possesses one or more than one kind(s) of
resources (out of the ten kinds of resources). For example, Table 3 shows two
agents in the experiment, i.e. a1 and a2. a1 and a2 possesses resource r2 and
r3, respectively.
The intentions of agents are to earn as much as possible award through
accomplishing tasks of users. Agents need to contribute their resources to ac-
complish tasks.
5.1.2 Tasks:
Tasks in the experiments are composed according to Definition 1. Each task
has a reward and a set of required resources. For example, Table 4 shows two
sample tasks, i.e. t1 and t2. The reward of t1 is w=40. To accomplish t1, an
agent team needs to (at least) possess resource r1, r2, r3 and r7. The reward
of t2 is w=60. To accomplish t2, an agent team needs to (at least) possess
resource r3 ,r4, r7, r8, r9 and r10.
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Table 4: Sample Tasks
ID r′1 r
′
2 r
′
3 r
′
4 r
′
5 r
′
6 r
′
7 r
′
8 r
′
9 r
′
10 Reward
t1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 40
t2 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 60
In the experiments, tasks are recorded in a Task File. Agents receive incom-
ing tasks from the user through reading Task Files. Then, agents execute these
tasks by using three different team forming mechanisms, i.e. (1) the one-shot
team forming mechanism, (2) the long-term team forming mechanism, and (3)
the flexible team forming mechanism, respectively.
5.2 Experiment Executions and Results
To evaluate the flexible team forming mechanism, two sets of experiments are
executed. These two experiments compare the performances of the three team
forming mechanisms in two scenarios: (1) let fixed agents process unfixed tasks;
(2) let unfixed agents process a set of fixed tasks.
5.2.1 Experiment One:
In Experiment One, ten agents (a1, a2, ..., a10) are included in the MAS. These
agents possess one of the ten resources (r1, r2, ..., r10), respectively. Various
numbers of tasks are input to the MAS. The agents form teams and execute
tasks by using the three team forming mechanisms, respectively. Through this
experiment, we want to compare the performance of the three team forming
mechanisms toward different numbers of tasks.
In Experiment One, there are two output parameters, which are used to
compare the effectiveness and rationality of the three team forming mechanisms.
These two parameters are Agent Searching Times (AST ) and Agent Earned
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Reward (AER):
• AST is the times that a team leader needs to search for required agents
to accomplish the tasks. In general, the higher AST, the more communi-
cation cost the team leader needs to spend on searching agents.
• AER is the total reward that each individual agent earned. In Experiment
One, AER is used to evaluate the rationality of an agent team organisa-
tion. It is because that the possessed resources of different agents are
different. In such a situation, a one-shot team has an ideal organisation
because all its team members contribute to task executions and there is
no resource redundancy in the MAS. Hence, in Experiment One, Agent
Earned Rewards (AERs) of one-shot team members are considered as the
benchmark of team organisation rationality. Agent teams that have closer
AERs with one-shot teams are considered as more rational.
The results of Experiment One are shown in Figure 5 and Table 5. Figure
5 compares the Agent-Searching Times (ASTs) of the three mechanisms. From
this figure, it can be seen that the flexible team forming mechanism always has
the least AST. On the contrary, the AST of one-shot team forming is much
higher than both long-term and flexible team forming. In addition, as the
number of tasks increases, the AST of the one-short team forming mechanism
increases much faster then the other two mechanisms. This result shows that
the communication consumption in the one-shot team forming mechanism is
the highest. This is because that agent teams in the one-shot team forming
mechanism are disbanded when each task is accomplished, and then, the team
leader needs to regroup a new team for the new task. On the contrary, the
long-term team forming mechanism and the flexible team forming mechanism
keep the whole team or part of a team after each task is accomplished. Hence,
they can have less communication consumptions.
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Figure 5: Agent Searching Times Comparison
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The AERs of the three mechanisms are listed in Table 5. From the data
in Table 5, it can be seen that the AERs of flexible teams are closer to the
AERs of one-shot teams in most situations. Hence, the flexible teams have
more reasonable organisational structure than that of long-term teams.
5.2.2 Experiment Two:
In Experiment Two, agents are included in the MAS to process a set of tasks
that contain five tasks. The resource requirement and the task reward of the five
tasks are shown in Table 6. In Experiment Two, we firstly let ten agents (a1, a2,
..., a10), which are same as agents in Experiment One, to process the five tasks
by using the three team forming mechanisms. Then, we include more agents
that possess the same resource with a1 to the MAS, and let agents of the MAS
to reprocess the same task set by using the three team-forming mechanisms.
Reward Rate (RR) is the output parameter of Experiment Two. The RR
of an agent represents the reward that the agent has received in participating
each task. The RR of an agent ak can be calculated by using Formula 17, where
AERk is the total reward that ak has received, CSij is the Contributor Set of
each task (refer to Definition 5), M is the size of a task set.
RRk =
AERk∑M
j=1 1 (j|ak ∈ CSij)
(17)
The result of Experiment Two is shown in Figure 6. This figure shows the
difference of the three team forming mechanisms as duplicated agents (agents
with the same resource as a1) are added in the MAS. In the one-shot teams and
the long-term teams, the RR of a1 does not change after more agents with the
same resource as a1 are added in the MAS. a1’s RR in long-term teams is lower
than a1’s RR in one-shot teams. It is because that long-term teams may keep
“unnecessary” team members. By using the flexible team forming mechanism,
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Table 5: The List of Agent Earned Rewards
Agent Mechanism
Number of Tasks
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
a1
Flexible 220 422 772 1171 1277 1565 1832 1992 2171 2513
OneShot 220 430 770 1040 1290 1550 1830 2060 2170 2550
LongTerm 237 443 738 990 1178 1534 1870 1964 2158 2484
a2
Flexible 228 505 661 1016 1304 1486 2069 2119 2205 2563
OneShot 230 520 670 1050 1330 1530 1860 2120 2210 2590
LongTerm 244 497 700 990 1297 1436 1768 2201 2165 2557
a3
Flexible 256 481 776 809 1350 1488 1797 1928 2497 2385
OneShot 260 490 780 820 1390 1530 1840 1890 2260 2430
LongTerm 288 452 802 925 1312 1641 1873 1866 2105 2342
a4
Flexible 248 456 855 1064 1429 1453 1875 1773 2376 2301
OneShot 260 440 730 1080 1230 1470 1920 1810 2480 2330
LongTerm 254 504 728 1182 1253 1494 1985 1846 2436 2273
a5
Flexible 255 409 642 1069 1238 1449 1751 1999 2307 2354
OneShot 250 410 670 1070 1270 1500 1770 2050 2390 2410
LongTerm 283 477 684 1012 1254 1486 1784 2122 2361 2497
a6
Flexible 287 533 813 947 1161 1424 1584 1865 2089 2354
OneShot 260 550 830 960 1170 1450 1620 1930 2100 2260
LongTerm 219 571 888 1009 1313 1473 1756 1905 2210 2268
a7
Flexible 241 526 670 1019 1269 1617 1831 1985 2346 2617
OneShot 240 530 680 1030 1280 1320 1830 2010 1280 2700
LongTerm 246 511 663 1042 1351 1430 1834 1907 2487 2612
a8
Flexible 231 580 782 905 1289 1262 1707 1965 2332 2411
OneShot 240 510 820 910 1310 1330 1720 2010 2360 2500
LongTerm 254 480 836 939 1381 1313 1610 1958 2477 2625
a9
Flexible 309 503 743 970 1327 1312 1919 2102 2174 2561
OneShot 320 520 760 1010 1340 1330 1960 2130 2210 2620
LongTerm 263 518 743 922 1358 1389 1803 2095 2124 2685
a10
Flexible 226 537 737 889 1157 1555 1585 1842 2162 2326
OneShot 230 550 740 890 1190 1600 1600 1860 2230 2370
LongTerm 238 499 656 950 1105 1416 1666 1905 2138 2540
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Table 6: The Five Tasks in Experiment Two
ID r′1 r
′
2 r
′
3 r
′
4 r
′
5 r
′
6 r
′
7 r
′
8 r
′
9 r
′
10 Reward
t1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 50
t2 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 70
t3 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 50
t4 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 40
t5 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 60
the RR of a1 decreases as more agents (with the same resource as a1) are
added in the MAS. This denotes that the flexible team forming mechanism will
adjust agents’ rewards as the agent resources changes. Therefore, the result
of Experiment Two shows that the flexible team forming mechanism is more
suitable for open environment than the other two mechanisms.
From the results of the Experiment One and Experiment Two, it can be
seen that the flexible team forming mechanism is more suitable for self-interested
agents and open environments. It can enable agent teams to keep valuable team
members according to their performance and changing of environments. Fur-
thermore, agent teams can adjust their long-term member selection standards
through modifying the member evaluation parameters. Therefore, comparing
with one-shot and long-term team forming, the flexible team forming mechanism
can enable self-interested agents form more rational teams in open environments
with less communication consumptions.
6 Related Work
Team forming is an important issue in MAS research. It is a subbranch of
agent coordination and organisation. In [8], Horling and Lesser reviewed most
important agent organisations in current MAS applications. Characteristics of
different organisations are evaluated in that paper. They also introduced agent
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Figure 6: Reward Rates Comparison
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team as a kind of typical multi-agent organisations, and pointed out that team
organisations have increased communication consumptions as a main drawback.
Communication consumptions and computational complexities of several
classic team forming and coordination strategies [9] [16] [25] were evaluated by
Pynadath through using the COMmunicative Multiagent Team Decision Prob-
lem (COM-MTDP) model [15]. COM-MTDP borrowed economic team theory
[12] [27] and provided a generic framework that evaluates team forming and co-
ordination strategies. Through the evaluation results obtained by Pynadath, it
is obvious that dynamics of joint goals, domain constrains and task requirements
would greatly increase communications within a team.
Gaston evaluated multi-agent organisational performance by using social
network theories [6]. Through several experiments, Gaston demonstrated that
MAS organisational performance were impacted by the underlying social net-
work structure.
A common feature of Pynadath and Gaston’s methods is that they all cited
sociologic theories. Especially in recent years, more and more MAS researchers
realised the benefit of citing human organisational theories into multi-agent
team forming. Market-base approaches, such as auction [20], voting [13] and
contract nets [26], have been applied in many MAS applications. These ap-
proaches are especially suitable for self-interested MASs. However, in most cur-
rent market-based approaches, the collaboration terms between agents are nor-
mally short (even one-shot). This feature could aggravate communication con-
sumption problems. Toward shortcomings of market-based approaches, Rathod
proposed a stable team forming strategy for self-interested agents [18]. This
idea is also cited from human society. Rathod also suggested to adopt different
team strategies in different working domains or situations. However, how to
select and automatically refresh different team strategies were not introduced
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in Rathod’s paper.
Comparing with above related researches, the mechanism presented in this
paper focuses on features of self-interested agents and tasks. In the mechanism,
agent and environment evaluations are included in team forming processes. Col-
laboration terms between agents are based on these evaluation results. The
flexible team forming mechanism can reduce communication consumptions and
avoid unreasonable collaboration relationships in agent teams. These advan-
tages have been approved in the experiments of Section 5. From the experiment
result, it can be seen that the mechanism presented in this paper has lower
communication cost than one-shot team forming, but the rationality of team
organisations is closer to optimal.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
As a social entity, self-interested agents need to collaborate with others in most
multi-agent environments. Unreasonable team forming mechanisms could cause
benefit conflicts between agents, or lead to unnecessary system consumptions.
Focused on challenges brought by dynamic application domains, many AI re-
searchers suggested hiring long-term or one-shot team forming mechanisms in
MASs. However, both of these two kinds of mechanisms had advantages and
disadvantages. Focused on features of self-interested multi-agent systems, ad-
vantages and disadvantages of one-shot and long-term team forming mechanisms
were evaluated in this paper. Furthermore, a flexible team-forming mechanism
was introduced. This mechanism could enable agents to automatically evaluate
the performance of other agents in the system, and to select team members
with reasonable terms and costs according to the evaluation result. In the flex-
ible team forming mechanism, factors related with agent performance and task
requirements were considered as evaluation factors. Through evaluating these
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factors, team compositions were more reasonable and could avoid some potential
benefit conflicts between team members.
In the future work of this research, more factors will be taken into account
through related evaluations. Also, the agent organisations discussed in this
paper are in very simple team structures. However, in many MAS applica-
tions, more complex organisation structures, such as congregation [3], could be
included in MASs. In addition, another trend of this research is to hire repu-
tation based methods [14] and social network analysis techniques [19] in team
forming mechanisms.
References
[1] S. Abdallah and V. Lesser. Organization-based cooperative coalition for-
mation. In Proceedings of IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on
Intelligent Agent Techonology (IAT), pages 162–168, Beijing, China, 2004.
[2] A. Artikis and J. Pitt. A formal model of open agent societies. In Pro-
ceedings of the 5th International Conference on Autonomous Agents, pages
192–193, Montreal, Canada, 2001.
[3] C. Brooks, E. Durfee, and A. Armstrong. An introduction to congregating
in multiagent systems. In Proceedings of 4th International Conference on
Multiagent Systems, pages 79–86, Boston, USA, 2000.
[4] K. Decker and V. Lesser. Designing a family of coordination algorithms. In
Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Multi-Agent Systems,
pages 73–80, San Francisco, USA, 1995.
[5] R. Eberhart, P. Simpson, and R. Dobbin. Computational Intelligence PC
Tools. AP Professional Press, Orlando, USA, 1996.
31
[6] M. Gaston and M. desJardins. Social network structures and their im-
pact on multi-agent system dynamics. In Proceedings of the 18th Interna-
tional Florida Artificial Intelligence Research Society Conference, Clearwa-
ter, USA, 2005.
[7] B. Gerkey and M. Mataric. Multi-robot task allocation: Analyzing the
complexity and optimality of key architectures. In Proceedings of the IEEE
International Conference on Robotics and Automation, pages 3862–3868,
Taibei, China, 2003.
[8] B. Horling and V. Lesser. A survey of multi-agent organizational paradigms,
knowledge engineering review. Knowledge Engineering Review, 19(4):281–
316, 2005.
[9] N. Jennings. Controlling cooperative problem solving in industrial multi-
agent systems using joint intentions. Artificial Intelligence, 75(2):195–240,
1995.
[10] V. Lesser. Reflections on the nature of multi-agent coordination and its
implications for an agent architecture. Journal of Autonomous Agents and
Multi-Agent Systems, 1(1):89–111, 1998.
[11] V. Lesser. Cooperative multiagent systems: A personal view of the state
of the art. IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering,
11(1):133–142, 1999.
[12] J. Marschak and R. Radner. The Economic Theory of Teams. Yale Uni-
versity Press, New Haven, CT, USA, 1971.
[13] J. Pitt, L. Kamara, M. Sergot, and A. Artikis. Voting in multi-agent
systems. The Computer Journal, 49(2):156–170, 2006.
32
[14] J. Pujol, R. Sanguesa, and J. Delgado. Extracting reputation in multi agent
systems by means of social network topology. In Proceedings of First Inter-
national Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems,
pages 467–474, Bologna, Italy, 2002. ACM Press.
[15] D. Pynadath and M. Tambe. The communicative multiagent team deci-
sion problem: Analyzing teamwork theories and models. Journal of AI
Research, 16:389–423, 2002.
[16] D. Pynadath and M. Tambe. An automated teamwork infrastructure for
heterogeneous software agents and humans. Journal of Autonomous Agents
and Multi-Agent Systems, 7(1-2):71–100, 2003.
[17] A. Rao and M. Georgeff. An abstract architecture for rational agents. In
Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Principles of Knowl-
edge Representation and Reasoning, pages 439–449, San Mateo, USA, 1992.
[18] P. Rathod and M. desJardins. Stable team formation among self-interested
agents. In Proceedings of AAAI Workshop on Forming and Maintaing
Coalitions in Adaptive Multiagent Systems, pages 29–36, San Jose, USA,
2004.
[19] J. Sabater and C. Sierra. Reputation and social network analysis in mul-
tiagent systems. In Proceedings of First International Joint Conference
on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pages 475–482, Bologna,
Italy, 2002. ACM Press.
[20] T. Sandholm. Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial
auctions. Artificial Intelligence, 135(1-2):1–54, 2002.
[21] O. Shehory. Methods for task allocation via agent coalition formation.
Artificial Intelligence Journal, 101(1-2):165–200, 1998.
33
[22] K. Sycara. Multiagent systems. AI Magazine, 19(2):79–92, 1998.
[23] M. Tambe. Implementing agent teams in dynamic multi-agent environ-
ments. Applied Artificial Intelligence, 12(2-3):189–210.
[24] M. Tambe. Agent architectures for flexible, practical teamwork. In Pro-
ceedings of the 14th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages
22–28, Rhode Island, USA, 1997.
[25] M. Tambe. Towards flexible teamwork. Journal of Artificial Intelligence
Research, 7:83–124, 1997.
[26] J. Yang, R. Havaldar, V. Honavar, L. Miller, and J. Wong. Coordination
and control of distributed knowledge networks using the contract net pro-
tocol. In Proceedings of the IEEE Information Technology Conference, New
York, USA, 1998.
[27] T. Yoshikawa. Decomposition of dynamic team decision problems. IEEE
Transactions on Automatic Control, AC-23(4):627–632, 1978.
34
